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By SUNG MIN HAN* 
This paper examines the effect of the government college loan 
program in Korea on student academic performance, dropout 
decisions and loan defaults. While fairness in educational 
opportunities has been guaranteed to some degree through this 
program, which started in 2009, there has been a great deal of 
controversy over its effectiveness. Empirical findings suggest that 
recipients of general student loan (GSL) lower academic performance 
than those who received income contingent loan (ICL). Moreover, for 
students attending private universities, a higher number of loans 
received increased the probability of a dropout decision, and students 
from middle-income households had a higher probability of being 
overdue than students from low-income households. These findings 
indicate that expanding the ICL program within the allowance of the 
government budget is necessary. Furthermore, providing opportunities 
for students to find various jobs and introducing a rating system for 
defaulters are two necessary tasks. 
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   I. Introduction 
 
ost high school graduates intend to obtain a tertiary education, as the social 
environment of Korea does not make it easy for them to have stable lives 
without a university degree. They have trouble in finding a quality job without a 
university degree, indeed finding it difficult to land any job. Moreover, promotions 
are rare without a degree for those who already have a job. In short, a university 
degree has become an essential condition for living in Korea. 
 
* Fellow, Korea Development Institute (e-mail: smhan@kdi.re.kr) 
* Received: 2015. 9. 4. 
* Referee Process Started: 2015. 9. 4. 
* Referee Reports Completed: 2016. 2. 2. 
M 
72 KDI Journal of Economic Policy FEBRUARY 2016 
It has become common for any high school student in Korea to consider going to 
university, and the progression rate of high school graduates going to university has 
reached a fairly high level compared to other countries. The average progression 
rate1 to university in Korea was 71% in 2008, which was at that time 15% point 
higher than the average for all OECD countries. This high university progression 
rate of Korea is due to the social environment and changes in the education policy 
made by the Korean government. 
First, high school graduates go on to university due to social pressure, 
considering a university degree to be essential. If students enter universities to 
develop themselves or to satisfy their academic curiosity, it would have a positive 
impact on both personal and national development.2 However, we should not 
overlook the current situation, in which they decide to go to university not out of 
any initial desire but mostly due to the social environment and pressure. It was also 
thought that the non-pecuniary cost3 is the critical factor determining the entry of 
students into the higher education market, considering also that the opportunity 
cost of not going to university will be high.  
Other main causes of the higher university progression rate were changes in the 
education policy of the government. The government introduced the Government-
Guaranteed Student Loan program in 2005, the General Student Loan program in 
2009, the Income-Contingent Loan program in 2010, and government scholarships 
(offering tuition assistance depending on students’ income levels) in 2012 to 
address the issue of students from low-income families not continuing on to higher 
education for financial reasons. If students from low-income households do not go 
to universities out of economic reasons, there would be no choice for them but to 
advance to the job market after graduating from high school. A student without 
sufficient expertise will have a difficult time finding a job and, even if he or she 
finds a job, will be more likely to have a low-quality job. This will create a vicious 
circle, trapping the person in poverty. For this reason, the government introduced a 
tuition aid program, a mixture of scholarships and student loans, in order to 
mitigate these students’ problems so as to help those not otherwise able to receive a 
higher education. The program definitely helped students with financial need to 
undertake higher education, and it improved the fairness of opportunities in 
education. On the other hand, it also increased the university progression rate. 
Furthermore, we have observed side effects of the program; threats to government 
finances due to excessive government support and increases in payments overdue 
owing to financial difficulties in the repayment of the student loans.  
This is reasonable considering the effort to solve a market failure of the type that 
can occur in a credit market, in which a program supports students with financial 
need to ensure the fairness of educational opportunities. However, considerable 
government funding is needed to run such a program. Therefore, rigorous 
discussions are necessary to determine if the student loan program started in 2005 
 
1This is calculated according to the ratio of the number of high school graduates per year entering university 
that year to the number of high school graduates of the same year. 
2The theory of economic development argues that educated people have higher productivity and that a 
country can achieve sustainable economic development through them. Other benefits of education are a decrease 
in both crime rates and unemployment rates, as well as an improvement in public health overall.  
3The major portion of the non-pecuniary cost is the stigma effect, meaning that members of a society consider 
a person without a university diploma as an inferior human being.  
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has been efficiently operated. Moreover, it should be determined if the objectives 
of the program have been fully met. Fairness in educational opportunities not only 
refers to the possibility for students to receive a higher education but ensuring an 
environment that allows students to focus fully on their studies continually. The 
validity of the program is only ensured when it helps students while they are in 
school while also allowing them to enter university.  
Numerous studies have evaluated the effectiveness of student loan programs. 
Most focused on the effects of student loan programs on the enrollment rate, 
academic performance, dropout rate, and graduation rate, particularly considering 
income levels. They found that the effects of student loans varied according to the 
income class of the students, and they emphasized the need for active support of 
students from the low-income classes. Specifically, they suggested that students 
from the low-income classes need scholarships or other types of financial aid (Kim 
et al. 2008a; Kim et al. 2009b).  
There has been growing interest in the effects of loan programs on the 
enrollment rate. Students’ ability is positively correlated with the university 
enrollment rate, which increases with income (Lochner et al. 2011). Kim et al. 
(2008b) also argue that students from the low-income class have a higher potential 
for longer enrollment durations due to economic reasons, and a higher percentage 
of them took out student loans. They claim that a financial aid program in 
accordance with income should be implemented. A strong correlation between 
household income and university enrollment was shown after analyzing the data in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s (Belley and Lochner 2007). Moreover, it was 
reported that a student loan program operating at private Mexican universities 
raises university enrollment by approximately 24% and that loan beneficiaries 
show higher academic performance by 3% than non-beneficiaries (Canton and 
Blom 2004; Rau et al. 2013). In contrast, Cameron and Heckman (1998) report 
after analyzing data in the 1980s in the United States that household income 
scarcely influences university enrollment when the effects of the students’ home 
environments, AFQT scores, and degrees of unobservable heterogeneity are 
excluded.  
Kim et al. (2009a) analyze the effects of scholarships and student loans on 
students’ grades by income level using KEEP data (2005-2007). They report that 
scholarships are an effective means of improving students’ grades for those in the 
medium-income classes. In addition, the effects of student loans on students’ 
grades for students from the low-income class were significantly weaker than those 
from the upper-income classes.  
In addition, much of the work on the impact of student loan programs has 
focused on dropout decisions. Stress from school life affects the dropout decisions 
of students from the low-income class more than credit constraints does. However, 
stress from school life is closely related to economic issues and, consequently, 
financial problems are associated with the dropout rate (Stinebrickner et al. 2007). 
Rau et al. (2013) analyze the State Guaranteed Loan (SGL) program of Chile using 
a sequential schooling decision model and report that the SGL program decreases 
the dropout rate. Furthermore, they show that it is especially effective in reducing 
the dropout rate of unskilled students from low-income families. 
Graduation rates can vary according to students’ income levels, and students 
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from top income quartile have a higher graduation rate by 40% than those from the 
bottom income quartile (Haveman and Wilson 2007). Students receiving financial 
aid finish their degrees more rapidly than students without support, but the study 
duration is not shortened with more financial support. However, there is a higher 
probability of successfully finishing a degree with more financial aid (Glocker 
2011).  
Studies of student labor market outcomes show that students with higher student 
loan amounts tend to find employment quicker with a greater potential of holding a 
low-wage job than students with lower student loan amounts (Kim et al. 2012). 
They report that these results indicate the possibility of worsening income 
inequality after they enter the labor market, considering that students with higher 
student loan amounts would financially be in a harsher condition. A beneficiary of 
the State Guaranteed Loan (SGL) program has a higher probability of holding a 
low-wage job in the labor market, which raises a question about the quality of 
education (Rau et al. 2013).  
Previous domestic studies analyze how the student loan system affects the 
enrollment rate, student performance, continuity of academic study, and 
employment. However, there is a limitation when evaluating the effectiveness of 
widely employed government student loan programs, as analyses are not conducted 
according to the loan type. Moreover, research has not examined the factor of 
overdue payments; therefore, there is no evidence pertaining to the sustainability of 
the program. Although many in-depth analyses have evaluated various effects of 
student loan programs in other countries, it is challenging directly to apply these 
results to Korean loan programs due to the many differences among these student 
loan programs.  
There are two channels through which a student loan program affects student 
academic performance. The majority of the student loan is to pay for tuition. In the 
absence of a student loan program, students likely will have to hold a part-time job. 
However, if students have access to a loan program, it allows them to spend more 
time studying instead of working. This can reduce the probability of them taking a 
leave of absence or dropping out of school. Furthermore, it may improve their GPA 
and let them graduate on time.  
On the other hand, if a student has received a student loan and has decided to 
take a part-time job to pay for the loan (principal and/or interest), the student will 
have less time to study. However, if the student works as a teaching assistant or 
research assistant, it would be difficult to conclude that working always has 
negative effects on academic performance. A problematic situation is when a 
student is forced to work in a job unrelated to school because he or she needs 
money for living expenses. Working to pay an urgent debt can cause students to 
underperform in classrooms or to drop out of school owing to a lack of studying 
hours and due to the psychological and economic burden.4  Therefore, it is 
important to analyze if student loans influence academic performance and dropout 
decisions as part of the effort to improve the program.  
 
4Another negative effect of student loans occurs when recipients hold low-quality jobs and must pay the loan 
quickly, starting the job with existing debt (Kim et al. 2012). However, the ICL will lower the potential that 
students must take low-quality jobs as compared to the GSL given its use of a grace period until they are hired. 
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In addition, this study takes into account reductions of overdue payments by 
considering the characteristics of delinquent students, which is a factor threatening 
the sustainability of the program. The amount of student loans overdue increased 
from 304.6 billion won in 2010 to 504.4 billion won in 2012. Once the ICL type 
enters into repayment, the government financial burden will be worsened due to the 
increased unemployment under the currently harsh global economic conditions. 
This can directly affect the sustainability of the program. For this reason, an 
analysis of this issue will be important.  
In conclusion, this study aims to evaluate the impacts of government college 
loan programs on students’ academic performance levels and dropout decisions. 
Academic performance and dropout decisions are chosen as the elements to 
analyze because they are closely related to the learning environment.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Chapter II introduces the 
history of the government college loan programs, and a theoretical analysis based 
on the human capital model is presented in Chapter III. Chapter IV discusses the 
data and empirical strategy. Chapter V presents the empirical findings regarding the 
impact of the college loan programs. Chapter VI finally concludes this study and 
presents policy implications. 
 
II. Background of the Government College Loan Programs in Korea 
 
The Korean government instigated the GSL during the second semester of 2009 
and the ICL during the first semester of 2010 to provide equal higher education 
opportunities regardless of income and to ensure that students could fully 
concentrate on studying. The main difference between these two programs is the 
repayment time. The ICL does not require repayment until students enter the labor 
market and have an adequate level of earnings to pay back the loan. However, GSL 
recipients are supposed to pay the loan back from the time they receive it. The GSL 
program supports tuition and living expenses up to 2 million won per year at an 
fixed interest rate of 2.9% per year to university students from households in the 
top 20% by income and who are younger than 56, took more than 12 credits in the 
previous semester, and have a GPA higher than a C (70/100). Students freely set the 
grace period and payment term and pay the monthly interest (principal and interest) 
from the time they receive the loan. Meanwhile, the ICL program provides tuition 
and living expenses up to 3 million won per year at a variable interest rate starting 
at 2.9% per year to university students from the bottom 80% of households in 
terms of income who are also younger than 35, took more than 12 credits during 
the previous semester, and have a GPA higher than a C (70/100). 
The government also introduced a government scholarship program in 2012 in 
addition to these two loan programs. It provides various amounts of financial aid to 
students depending on their income level. It only supports students below the 80% 
mark in terms of income. From 2014, it provided full tuition (4.5 million won) to 
students from households in the lower 20% group in terms of income and a portion 
of tuition (approximately 675 thousand won) to students from households in the 70 to 
80% income level bracket. That is, the GSL, the ICL and government scholarship 
program support students differently depending on their GPA and income level. 
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TABLE 1— CURRENT STATUS OF THE GENERAL STUDENT LOAN AND  
INCOME-CONTINGENT LOAN PROGRAMS BY YEAR 
(UNIT: 100 MILLION WON, PERSON) 
Amount of Loan Number of Recipients 
2009 General Student Loan 12,014 331,470 
2010 
Income-Contingent Loan 8,456 232,448 
General Student Loan 19,205 528,943 
Subtotal 27,661 761,391 
2011 Income-Contingent Loan 10,873 303,792 
General Student Loan 15,980 429,742 
Subtotal 26,853 733,534 
2012 Income-Contingent Loan 15,150 510,052 
General Student Loan 8,115 217,615 
Subtotal 23,265 727,667 
2013 Income-Contingent Loan 17,811 590,746 
General Student Loan 7,709 194,054 
Subtotal 25,520 784,800 
Note: A student from a household with three children or more can receive an ICL regardless of income 
level. 
  
Although students from almost all income levels except the top income classes can 
receive scholarships, the amounts vary among them. This program allows students 
to receive loans as well as scholarships simultaneously. However, it is not enough 
for some students to cover their full tuition, and they are forced to take out a loan to 
cover the difference.  
The student loan amounts and the number of recipients by year are shown in 
Table 1. The ICL started by lending 850 billion won in 2010 and had continuously 
more borrowers – nearly 600 thousand people borrowed about 1.78 trillion won in 
2013. In contrast, the amounts and number of recipients for the GSL continuously 
decreased from 330 thousand and 1.2 trillion won in 2009 to 190 thousand and 770 
billion in 2013. Considering the slight changes in the total number of beneficiaries 
during these years, it can be concluded that students who used the GSL program 
converted to the ICL program. 
Figure 1 shows the number of beneficiaries of the GSL and ICL programs by 
income and academic performance for the first semester of 2010 and the second 
semester of 2012. Although the ICL was launched in 2010, it was not fully 
advertised to the public. Therefore, many students utilized the GSL program and 
most borrowers had GPAs higher than a B. The majority of ICL beneficiaries were 
students from households in the lower 70% in terms of income level, and most of 
them had GPAs higher than a B. Students with a GPA of C mainly used the GSL 
program at the early stage of the ICL, although the GPA cutline for the ICL was a 
C. This suggests that students did not have a good understanding of the loan 
programs.5 
The number of ICL beneficiaries greatly exceeded that of GSL beneficiaries in 
 
5Nam (2012) reports a positive correlation between the level of understanding of the ICL and use of the 
program. 
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2012. Particularly, students with a GPA at the C level increasingly used the ICL 
program instead of the GSL program. Students from low-income families 
(households with income levels in the bottom 30%) mainly used the ICL program. 
However, the number of GSL beneficiaries during the second semester of 2012 
shows that students from lower 70% of households in terms of income often 
received this type. This may have occurred because a student from a household 
with three or more children can utilize the ICL program regardless of income. 
 
 
 
Note: RBL represents recipients of basic living costs. A, B, C and D indicate students’ grades during each 
semester, and income level is divided into deciles. 
   
 
Note: RBL represents recipients of basic living costs. A, B, C and D indicate students’ grades during each 
semester, and income level is divided into deciles. 
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Note: RBL represents recipients of basic living costs. A, B, C and D indicate students’ grades during each 
semester, and income level is divided into deciles. 
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III. Theoretical Framework 
 
According to human capital investment theory, borrowing constraints may alter 
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individuals invest human capital regardless of their wealth. Meanwhile, they invest 
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available, up to tuition and living expenses in the ICL and GSL programs. 
Therefore, this section investigates whether the level of human capital investment 
differs in these cases.6 To assess this, the general human capital investment model 
proposed by Lochner et al. (2011) is used, and a simple two-period-lived individual 
model is applied, as described below. 
Individuals invest in schooling and work during the first and second periods, 
respectively. Their utilities are then expressed as 
 
(1)                     0 1( ) u c u c   
 
where ct denotes consumption during period t	(t =	0 or 1); β > 0 is a discount 
factor; and u(·) is a positive, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice 
continuously differentiable function. Each individual is endowed with financial 
wealth w	(w > 0) and ability a (a > 0). He invests in human capital to increase 
his future labor earnings, and labor earnings (y	) at t = 1 are equal to af	(h). Here, 
h is human capital investment and f	(·) is a positive, strictly increasing, strictly 
concave, and twice continuously differentiable function that satisfies Inada 
conditions. He can borrow money d	(d < 0) to pay his tuition during school with a 
gross interest rate of, R(>1). If an individual is not restricted by borrowing 
constraints, he maximizes his utility (1) under the consumption levels in each 
period. 
 
OC w d h    
(2)               1C af ( h ) Rd   
 
Then, the condition to determine the optimal level of human capital investment 
in order to maximize the present value of net lifetime income is as follows, 
 
(3)                  
 
 0 u1
u c
af '( h ) R,
   u c   

 
 
Where uh  indicates the optimal level of human capital investment without 
borrowing constraints. 
For the ICL program, there exists only one borrowing constraint. There is a limit 
to the loan amount that a student can receive (up to tuition and living expenses). At 
this point, we consider a fixed upper limit on the amount of debt. The constraints 
for the ICL program are then as follows: 
 
 
 
6Suppose that a student cannot borrow money in a financial market due to credit constraints. In such a case, it 
is clear that if the student receives funds from the ICL or GSL program, he or she can invest human capital more 
compared to when credit constraints exist. Nonetheless, because this study places emphasis on comparing the level 
of human capital investment depending on the difference between the upper limit of the loan amount and the 
repayment method, the case without credit constraints is compared.  
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OC w d h    
1C af ( h ) Rd   
(4)                        maxd d  
 
The condition to determine the optimal level of human capital investment is 
expressed as shown below. 
 
(5)                i * * 1af '( h ) R ( )u c

       
 
In this equation,   is the LaGrange multiplier; it is strictly positive when the 
constraint binds and is = 0 otherwise. Here, ih  indicates the optimal level of 
human capital investment in the ICL program. 
For the GSL program, there are two borrowing constraints. Once students 
borrow money during period 0, they should repay the money during period 0, with 
the rest of the money to be reimbursed during period 1. As above, another 
restriction is that there exists a fixed upper limit to the loan amount. Therefore, the 
constraints can be expressed as 
 
0C w d h rd     
1C af ( h ) (1 r )Rd    
(6)                        maxd d  
 
where r	(0 < r < 1) is the ratio of the repayment to the total amount students 
must pay back. Under these constraints, the optimization problem is as follows, 
 
(7)             1
g ** ** )
1 r
af '( h ) R (
u c
      , 
 
where gh  indicates the optimal level of human capital investment in the case of 
the GSL program. 
Based on the optimal level of human capital investment in each case, this study 
considers how borrowing constraints affect human capital investment. In a 
comparison of (3) and (5), (5) is found to be greater because   is positive and 
f	(·) is strictly concave and increasing. Therefore, uh  is greater than ih . 
 
i u *af '( h ) af '( h ) 0    
(8)      u ih h  
 
Next, when comparing (5) and (7), (7) is found to be greater because r is less than 
1 and f (·) is strictly concave and increasing. Therefore, ih is greater than ℎ௚. 
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g i (**) *) )af '( h af '( h 0      
(9)                        i gh h  
 
Finally, the optimal levels of human capital investment are ordered as follows: 
 
(10)                      u i gh h h   
   
In short, once borrowing constraints concerning the upper limit of the loan 
amount and the repayment method are lifted, the optimal level of human capital 
investment may be reduced. Comparing the two different loan programs, the 
optimal level of human capital investment in the GSL program is lower than that in 
the ICL program. This can be explained according to the difference in the 
repayment time. While a GSL should be partly repaid during period 0, an ICL is 
repaid during period 1. For the GSL program, students need to pay the principal or 
interest while they are in school. However, if they cannot afford this, they may 
choose to work. If this is the case, the time to study can be reduced, which can 
negatively affect their academic performance. Under the assumption that students 
allocate time for study and work, their repayment burden may be reduced when 
accumulating human capital investment. 
 
IV. Data and Estimation Strategy 
 
A. Administrative Data 
 
This study uses two different datasets to observe the effects of government 
student loan programs on academic performance, dropout decisions and to analyze 
the characteristics of those who default in relation to the programs. First, unique 
data supported by the Ministry of Education is used to determine the relative 
effects of the programs on academic achievement and to assess the characteristics 
of those in default in the programs. While it is impossible to compare students 
receiving loans with those not receiving them because the administrative data only 
contains information about recipients, it is possible to analyze the relative effects of 
different loan programs by comparing GSL recipients to ICL recipients. 
Nonetheless, because these two programs have different repayment methods, an 
analysis of the relative effect of academic performance is useful to measure which 
system is more effective at improving academic performance. This dataset contains 
information on students who received a GSL or ICL from the second semester of 
2009 to the second semester of 2012. There were 917,509 students who received a 
loan, and the total number of observations is 1,563,554. Table 2 describes the 
descriptive statistics of this dataset. 
In Table 2, female students received a loan slightly more often, and the average 
age of a recipient is 22 years. The recipients’ scores were found to be between 80 
and 90. Once they are converted to the 4.5 point scale, the result is approximately 
3.69 points. Students attending private universities received loans more often than  
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TABLE 2— DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 
(UNIT: MONTH, WON) 
Variables No. of obs Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Sex 1,563,554 0.552 0.497 0 1 
Age 1,563,554 22.274 3.620 14 57 
Grade 1,563,554 2.199 0.694 0 3 
Private University 1,563,554 0.873 0.333 0 1 
Income Deciles 1,563,554 4.658 2.966 0 10 
The loan amount received 1,563,554 3,261,175 1,160,740 100,000 24,200,000 
The repayment amount 1,563,554 495,795 1,041,388 0 23,200,000 
Overdue period 58,165 15 22.8 2 59 
Overdue amount 58,133 3,015,649 1,209,098   1,694 9,976,500 
GSL Tuition 599,785 3,227,698 976,518 100,000 24,200,000 
Living expenses 20,678 1,118,846 848,461 500,000 15,000,000 
Tuition and living expenses 189,028 3,878,549 1,045,651 508,000 11,000,000 
ICL Tuition 295,050 3,029,577 1,014,538 100,000 24,200,000 
Living expenses 65,316 1,573,564 1,349,743 500,000 23,700,000 
Tuition and living expenses 393,697 3,578,123 1,112,757 600,000 15,900,000 
Note: Grade is provided with an interval. The intervals of less than 70, 70~80, 80~90 and over 90 are defined as 0, 
1, 2 and 3. The 0 income decile represents beneficiaries of basic living costs. 
 
those attending public universities. This reflects the fact that the tuition at private 
universities is much higher than that at public universities. The main advantage of 
using this data is that it provides information about the income deciles for students 
who received a loan as well as those who default on their payments. The income 
decile of students who received a loan is 4.7, and the loan amount is around 3 
million won, on average. In addition, the overdue period of those in default is 15 
months, and the amount due is approximately 3 million won. 
Using the administrative data, the following equation is used to determine the 
relative effect of the programs on academic performance. The regression equation 
is expressed below,  
 
(11)              it it it i t itGPA = Loan βX +c +y +ε+ , 
 
where i indicates the student, t is the year, and GPA represents the grade point 
average achieved. Loan equals 1 if a student receives a GSL and is 0 otherwise, 
and X is a control variable which influences a student’s academic performance. 
These can include sex, age, type of school (public university or private university), 
income, school region, total loan amount, payment, overdue period, and overdue 
amount. ic  represents a student’s unobservable characteristics, ty denotes the 
year effects, and eit is an error term. In this data set, the GPA is provided with a 
range. Thus, it is represented as follows: below 70 is 0, above 70 and below 80 is 1, 
above 80 and below 90 is 2, and over 90 is 3.	Year effects of variables influencing 
academic performance were considered for a longitudinal analysis, and a fixed-
effect model analysis was conducted to control for unobservable characteristics. 
In addition, continuous efforts should be made to lower the overdue rate, as large 
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amounts which are overdue can threaten the sustainability of the loan system. This 
study considers a means of lowering the overdue rate and helping delinquent 
borrowers by analyzing the characteristics of delinquency and determining the 
income classes most likely to be delinquent. To achieve this goal, the following 
equation is devised, 
 
(12)             it it it i t itDefault =αIncDec +βX +c +y +ε , 
 
where i indicates the student, t is the year, and Default is a dummy variable 
indicating whether a payment is overdue. IncDec is the income decile of the 
student. X is a control variable which affects the probability of default. It can 
represent gender, age, the loan balance, the type of school (public university or 
private university), the school region and the total loan amount. 
 
B. Korean Education and Employment Panel (KEEP) Data 
 
The Korean Education and Employment Panel (KEEP) was launched in 2004 to 
provide basic data for establishing national human resources development policy, 
education policy and labor market policy. KEEP data traces 2,000 middle school 
seniors, 2,000 high school seniors and 2,000 occupational high school seniors 
yearly since 2004. In 2014, the ninth follow-up survey was carried out, containing 
a wealth of information regarding the educational experiences, grades and jobs of 
the participants. This data is used to determine how loans interact with dropout 
decisions. For this purpose, data were collected from 2011 to 2012 and were 
formulated into panel data after merging with each student’s identification code. 
Descriptive statistics from the KEEP data are shown in Table 3.  
3,468 students were used in the analysis of dropout decisions, and there were 
6,935 observations for the two years. 58% of the data is from female students, and 
the school entrance year is 2006 on average. The proportion of those experiencing 
 
TABLE 3— DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF KEEP DATA 
(UNIT: %) 
Variables Number of observations Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Sex 6,935 0.579 0 0 1 
Entrance year 6,935 2006.7 1.422 2005 2012 
Dropout decision 6,935 0.245 0.430 0 1 
Number of loans received  6,895 2.026 0.537 1 3 
Job 6,929 0.484 0.500 0 1 
Monthly income(ten thousand won) 6,255 130.017 313.894 0 4000 
Existence of debt 6,780 0.204 0.403 0 1 
Major 6,931 3.773 1.788 1 9 
School region 6,935 7.007 4.579 1 17 
Public school 6,882 0.781 0.414 0 1 
Scholarship received at  
a previous year 6,935 0.117 0.322 0 1 
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a dropout among the sample is approximately 24.5%, and students received loans 
two times on average during the period. 20% and 11.7% of students among the 
sample are in debt and scholarship recipients, respectively. Contrary to the 
administrative data, 78% of students attend a public school. The tuition for private 
university is in general two times higher than that for public university. Thus, it 
would be interesting to determine if the type of school affects dropout decisions. 
Regarding the dropout decision analysis, students who experienced a dropout are 
compared with students who did not. A logit model regression analysis is applied 
with using dropout experience as a dependent variable and variables influencing 
dropout decisions as independent variables. The type of school (public university 
or private university), the major, the location of the school, the presence of an on-
campus job, monthly income, the existence of debt, and number of loans are 
considered as control variables affecting a leave of absence. Year effects of 
variables influencing a dropout decision are considered for a longitudinal analysis, 
and a fixed-effects model analysis is conducted to control unobservable 
characteristics. The regression equation is given below. 
 
(13)              it it it i t itDropout =αNoL +βX +c +y +ε  
 
Here, i indicates a student, t is the year and NoL is the number of loans 
received. X are control variables which affect the probability of default, such as the 
type of school (public university or private university), the major, the location of 
the school, the presence of an on-campus job, monthly income, wealth, and the 
existence of debt. 
 
V. Results 
 
A. Impact of College Loan Programs on Academic Performance 
 
The administrative data with the information for the GSL and ICL is used to 
determine the relative effect between these two loan programs. Table 4 shows the 
relative effects of the student loan programs on academic performance. 
Pooled regression for column 1 is conducted without controls, region or year 
effects. The findings indicate that the grades of GSL recipients are lower than those 
of ICL recipients. The more the loan amount increases, the more the grade 
decreases. The loan balance, overdue period and overdue amount all have negative 
effects on academic performance. Though control and region variables are added, 
the results in column 2 are similar to those in column 1. Lastly, the fixed-effects 
model is used to control unobservable characteristics in column 3.  
The results in column 3 do not differ greatly from those in columns 1 and 2, but 
the magnitudes of the coefficients are different. GSL recipients show lower 
academic performance than ICL recipients, and the average grade of the GSL 
recipients is 3.63 points (out of a total of 100 points) lower than that of the ICL 
recipients. As the loan amount increases by 1 million won, this value decreases by 
1.22 points. In addition, as the overdue amount increases by 1 million won, the 
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TABLE 4—RESULTS FOR THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENT COLLEGE LOAN PROGRAMS ON  
ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE ACCORDING TO ADMINISTRATIVE DATA 
 (UNIT: MIL WON, MONTH) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
GSL -0.193*** -0.239*** -0.363*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Loan amount -0.64*** -1.12*** -1.22*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Loan balance -0.49*** -0.51*** -0.20*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Overdue period -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Overdue amount -0.58*** -0.61*** -0.15*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Controls no yes yes 
Region no yes yes 
Year effect no no yes 
N 1,563,554 1,563,554 1,563,554 
Note: 1) Sex, age, school, region, total loan amount, payment, overdue period, and overdue 
amounts are included as controls. 2) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 3) *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
grade decreases by 0.15.  
From the evidence derived by the analysis of the administrative data, it is 
concluded that the GSL program has a negative effect on academic performance, 
which is consistent with the evidence presented in Section III. 
 
B. Impact of the College Loan Programs on Dropout Decision 
 
Table 5 presents the results pertaining to the determinants of dropout decisions 
according to the type of school. While Panel A indicates the results for the pooled 
sample of students attending private and public universities, Panel B and Panel C 
consider the type of school. Only the results for the variables of interest, the 
number of loans received and scholarships received during the previous year, are 
shown in Table 5.  
Column 1 begins with a simple logit regression without controls or fixed effects. 
First, as the number of loans received increases, the probability of a dropout 
decision increases by 20% in all three panels. Meanwhile, students who received a 
scholarship during the previous year drop out of school less than those who did not 
receive one. In column 2, factors that influence a dropout decision, such as a 
student’s major, the location of the school, monthly income, the existence of a job 
and debt are included as controls. In addition, as a dropout decision may be linked 
to the specific year, year effects are considered in column 3. The results in columns 
2 and 3 with controls and year effects are similar to those in column 1 despite the 
magnitude differences in the three panels. 
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TABLE 5—RESULTS FOR THE DETERMINANTS OF DROPOUT DECISION 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. Private and public school 
No. of loans received 0.200***
(0.009) 
0.123***
(0.010) 
0.119***
(0.010) 
0.031** 
(0.014) 
Scholarship received during the previous year -0.064***
(0.016) 
-0.096***
(0.015) 
-0.103***
(0.015) 
-0.049** 
(0.021) 
Observations 6895 6205 6205 6205 
Panel B. private school 
No. of loans received 0.223***
(0.025) 
0.149***
(0.027) 
0.144***
(0.027) 
0.069** 
(0.033) 
Scholarship received during the previous year -0.055***
(0.026) 
-0.078***
(0.027) 
-0.089***
(0.027) 
-0.054 
(0.033) 
Observations 1506 1403 1403 1403 
Panel C. public school 
No. of loans received 0.195***
(0.010) 
0.108***
(0.0110) 
0.104***
(0.010) 
0.023 
(0.016) 
Scholarship received at a previous year -0.074***
(0.020) 
-0.115***
(0.019) 
-0.120***
(0.019) 
-0.046* 
(0.028) 
Observations 5337 4756 4756 4756 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No No Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects No No No Yes 
Note: 1) Major, school location, monthly income, the existence of a job, and debt are included as controls. 
2) Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 3) *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
Finally, column 4 considers individual fixed effects with other controls. Panel A 
shows that the probability of dropout decision increases by 3% as the number of 
loans received increases. Akin to the results in the previous columns, students who 
received a scholarship during the previous year drop out of school less than those 
who did not receive one. However, because the tuitions between private and public 
universities differ significantly, it is important to determine if the dropout decision 
may also differ according to the type of university.  
Panel B and Panel C consider dropout decisions according to the type of school. 
Interestingly, as the number of loans received increases for students attending a 
private university, the probability of a dropout decision increases by 6.9%. The 
result for students at private universities is two times higher than that for Panel C 
on average. Meanwhile, for students attending a public university, the number of 
loans received does not have a statistically significant effect on a dropout decision. 
As discussed above, the higher tuition of private universities may have led to these 
results. Thus, one would expect that students attending a private university are 
more likely to have trouble paying their tuition. If we link these results to the 
delinquency rate, clearer policy suggestions can be provided.             
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C. Analysis of Defaulters’ Characteristics 
 
The ICL program, which allows students to pay back their loans when they are 
employed, began in 2010. Defaults cannot occur in the ICL framework 
conceptually, though a practical repayment plan has been devised. On the other 
hand, the GSL program has been implemented for nearly five years, and the total 
amount overdue has substantially increased since then. We have reached a pivotal 
moment with regard to managing those who default. It is necessary to determine 
which group has a higher probability of defaulting for the efficient management of 
delinquent students. Therefore, this analysis focuses on students who received a 
GSL. It is natural that variables strongly related to delinquency are household 
income, loan amounts and loan balances. Table 6 presents the characteristics of 
those who default after received a GSL.   
These results show that students who have high loan balances are more likely to 
be in default. Students’ academic performance levels have little impact on 
delinquency. Interestingly, as household income increases, the probability of being 
in default increases. It is possible to interpret this result in two different ways. 
First, the GSL interest rate is 2.9% per year, lower than any loan in the private 
sector. If a student (or household) borrows money both on the GSL program and in 
the private sector, GSL repayment may be pushed back on the priority list. The 
expectation that the government will protect those who default also plays a major 
role in delinquency decisions. However, this interpretation is not appropriate 
because students are restricted by financial transaction laws if their loans go unpaid 
for six months.   
The second interpretation is that the high university tuition places a burden on 
household economies even if students are not from low-income families. In 2012, 
tuition amounts at public and private universities are on average 4 million won and 
7.4 million won per semester, respectively. Average yearly income from the fourth  
 
TABLE 6—CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE WHO  
DEFAULT AFTER RECEIVING A GSL 
Variables (1) 
Loan balance 
0.388*** 
(0.016) 
Grade 
0.021 
(0.030) 
Age 
0.028*** 
(0.044) 
Income decile 
0.031*** 
(0.001) 
Controls yes 
Year effect yes 
N 25,010 
Note: 1) Sex, age, loan balance, type of school (public university or private 
university), school region and total loan amount are included as controls. 2) Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 3) *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
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TABLE 7—DELINQUENCY RATE BY INCOME DECILE 
Income Decile No. of recipients No. of delinquency 
Delinquency rate 
(%) 
1st 59,921 3,797  5.96 
2nd 96,785  4,849 4.77 
3rd 63,417  3,435 5.14 
4th 61,463  5,331 7.79 
5th 52,581  4,443 8.31 
6th  44,903  4,073 8.32 
7th 48,844  4,265  8.03 
8th 105,877  9,169 7.97 
9th 134,448 11,336 7.78 
10th 84,130 6,424 7.09 
 
to the seventh income deciles per household is 33 million won and 50 million won, 
respectively, while for the eighth income decile per household it is 58 million won. 
Once two students in a household attend a private university, 74% and 56% of the 
yearly income goes to pay tuition for households in the fifth and seventh income 
deciles, respectively. Thus, the high tuition may be a major cause of defaults in 
these cases. 
Table 7 presents the delinquency rate for GSL recipients according to their 
income decile. The delinquency rate from low-income families is lower than that 
for other income groups. This is related to the fact that the government 
continuously attempts to support students from low-income families. 7  The 
problem is how efficiently to manage those who default from middle-income 
families.  
The Korea Student Aid Foundation introduced a system in 2014 which allows 
the transfer of relatively high-interest debt from government-guaranteed loans 
(second semester of 2005 to the first semester of 2009) and the GSL program 
(second semester of 2009) to the Foundation’s low-interest student loan. However, 
to apply, debtors with government-guaranteed loans and loans from the GSL 
program must meet low-interest transfer qualifications. Among the criteria are no 
overdue balances, an account in good standing, and no ongoing legal processes. An 
applicant who is delinquent must clear the overdue payment to receive a transfer 
loan, making this program practically meaningless to those who are delinquent. A 
means of unconditionally relieving those who are delinquent can lead to moral 
hazard. However, it is necessary to give them a second chance. It is suggested to 
classify these debtors according to their repayment rate instead of treating all of 
them in the same way and to help them in efforts to gain a loan transfer. It appears 
that people with small amounts overdue are included in some cases along with 
those who are delinquent with high overdue amounts. The plan to provide the 
federation of banks with overdue information can be delayed or altered for students 
in financial need. Currently, students behind by more than six months on GSL 
 
7Type I of the national scholarship program provides students with various amounts of financial aid according 
to their income decile. Students in the first income decile up to the eighth can receive 4.5 mil won, 2.7 mil won, 
1.8 mil won, 1.35 mil won, 1.125 mil won, 0.9 mil won, and 67.5 mil won, respectively. This program places more 
emphasis on helping students from the low-income classes.  
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payments are registered as delinquents by the federation of banks. A graded 
information system should be considered, classifying those who are delinquent into 
several classes and give exemptions to those with small overdue amounts.  
Furthermore, it is necessary to consider a method which allows families with 
two children to use the ICL program, as the current program only allows families 
with three children or more to apply for an ICL when the family is in the upper 
20% income class. The government’s financial capability should be carefully 
examined in advance before pursing such a change. 
 
VI. Discussion and Policy Implications 
 
This study mainly focuses on the effects of the government college loan program 
on academic performance, dropout decisions and loan defaults. A simple theoretical 
model shows that the human capital investment level can vary depending on the 
type of student loan. The GSL program, which makes students start to pay their 
debt immediately after receiving the loan, can present a greater economical and 
psychological burden on students as compared to the ICL program, which has a 
grace period. This implies that the GSL program induces low human capital 
investment levels because students who receive a GSL due to financial constraints 
are forced to work for pay these loans off, thus having less time to study.  
An empirical analysis shows that the academic performance of GSL recipients is 
lower than that of ICL recipients. Moreover, having more loans increases the 
probability of a dropout decision, especially for students attending a private 
university. Finally, an analysis of the characteristics of delinquent borrowers 
reveals that students from the middle class have a greater probability of being 
overdue on their payments than students from low-income households.  
The government introduced college loan programs to provide equal 
opportunities to receive a higher education regardless of the income level of 
students and their families. These programs have clearly helped students in 
financial need to gain the opportunity to receive a higher education. However, it is 
necessary to provide an environment for students to continue their education 
comfortably as well as an opportunity to initiate study. Several suggestions are 
given below for politicians to improve the government loan programs based on the 
results found in this study.  
First, it is necessary to expand the ICL program within the allowance of the 
government’s finance condition. Currently, students use two types of loans 
depending on their income class. Discrimination based on income level should be 
gradually removed due to the high tuition rates of Korean universities. Some may 
debate the appropriateness of supporting high-income families. However, 
considering that government scholarships are provided at a level of 650 thousand 
won to students from households up to the 80% income level, further discussion is 
warranted.  
Secondly, various jobs should be created to allow students to work in an area 
related to their major. These can include on-campus jobs as well as positions at co-
op systems, providing links to future employment. The government and companies 
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currently have these types of programs and jobs, but they are too few in number. It 
is essential to build an infrastructure which can provide job information for student 
loan recipients.  
Lastly, it is necessary to devise a means of relieving those who are delinquent 
depending on their effort to pay the loan off as a means of managing delinquent 
payments. Creating a delinquent class can be an option. Those who are delinquent 
and who are also making an effort to pay off their loans can be given an option to 
delay the registration of a credit alert or to transfer their loan to the ICL program. 
This should be positively considered to reduce the delinquent rate and to provide a 
second opportunity to study. In conclusion, this study suggests that the government 
should try to pursue an education policy not for education providers but for 
education consumers.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
Belley, Philippe and Lance Lochner. 2007. “The Changing Role of Family Income and Ability 
in Determining Educational Achievement.” NBER Working Paper 13527. 
Cameron, Stephen V. and James Heckman. 1998. “Life Cycle Schooling and Dynamic 
Selection Bias: Models and Evidence for Five Cohorts of American Males.” Journal of 
Political Economy 106(2): 262–333. 
Canton, Erik and Andreas Blom. 2004. “Can Student Loans Improve Accessibility to Higher 
Education and Student Performance? An Impact Study of the Case of SOFES, Mexico.” 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3425. 
Glocker, Daniela. 2011. “The Effect of Student Aid on the Duration of Study.” Economics of 
Education Review 30(1): 177–190. 
Haveman, R. H. and Wilson, K. 2007. “Access, Matriculation, and Graduation.” In Economic 
Inequality and Higher Education, edited by S. Dickert-Conlin & R. Rubenstein, New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
Kim, Anna and ByungShik, Rhee. 2008a. “The Influence of Student Loans on the Students’ 
Intentions of Extended Stay in College by Income Level.” Korean Journal of Sociology of 
Education 18(4): 55-73 (in Korean). 
Kim, Anna and ByungShik, Rhee. 2008b. “The Effects of Financial Aids on Student Choice by 
Family Income Levels.” The Journal of Education and Science 39(1): 67-84 (in Korean). 
Kim, JiHa and ByungShik, Rhee. 2009a. “Examining the Differential Impacts of Financial Aid 
on College GPA by Income Level.” The Journal of Educational Administration 27(3): 447–
470 (in Korean). 
Kim, JiHa and ByungShik, Rhee. 2009b. “Who Needs College Student Loans Exploring the 
Characteristics of Student Loans Recipients.” The Journal of Economics and Finance of 
Education 18(1): 27–58 (in Korean). 
Kim, KyungNyun and Pilnam, Yi. 2012. “The Effects of Reliance on Student Loan on Early-
carrier Labor Market Outcomes of Four Year College Graduates.” The Journal of Economics 
and Finance of Education 21(2): 87–115 (in Korean). 
Lochner, Lance and Alexander Monge-Naranjo. 2011. “The Nature of Credit Constraints and 
Human Capital.” American Economic Review 101: 2487–2529. 
Stinebrickner, R. Todd and Ralph Stinebrickner. 2007. “The Effect of Credit Constraints on 
the College Dropout Decision: A Direct Approach Using a New Panel Study.” NBER 
Working Paper 13340. 
Tomás Rau, Eugenio Rojas, and Sergio Urzúa. 2013. “Loans for Higher Education: Does the 
Dream Come True?” NBER Working Paper 19138. 
 
  
VOL. 38 NO. 1     Student Academic Performance, Dropout Decisions and Loan Defaults 91 
WEBPAGES VISITED 
 
E-index Statistics Database. (http://www.index.go.kr, Accessed on November 14th, 2014) 
Korea Education and Employment Panel. (http://www.krivet.re.kr/ku/index.j, Accessed on 
November 14th, 2014) 
Korea Student Aid Foundation. (http://www.kosaf.go.kr, Accessed on November 14th, 2014) 
Korean Educational Development Institute (KEDI). Korean Educational Statistics Service . 
(http://kess.kedi.re.kr/index, Accessed on November 14th, 2014) 
 
 
LITERATURE IN KOREAN 
 
김경년·이필남, 「대학생 학자금대출이 초기 노동시장 성과에 미치는 영향」, 『교육재정 경제연구』, 제21권 
제2호, 2012, pp.87~115. 
김안나·이병식, 「소득수준에 따른 학생의 고등교육 선택의 차이와 학자금 지원의 효과」, 『교육과학연구』, 
제39집 제1호, 2008, pp.67~84. 
김안나·이병식, 「학자금대출이 대학 재학 기간 연장 가능성에 미치는 영향: 소득 계층별 분석」, 『교육사회
학연구』, 제18권 제4호, 2008, pp.55~73. 
김지하·이병식, 「대학생 학자금대출 수요 집단의 특성 분석」, 『교육재정 경제연구』, 제18권 제1호, 2009, 
pp.27~58. 
김지하·이병식, 「대학생 학업성취도에 대한 학자금 지원의 영향 분석: 직접효과, 소득 분위별 차이와 상호
작용 효과」, 『교육행정학연구』, 제27권 제3호, 2009, pp.447~470. 
 
